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Linearly Convergent Variable Sample-Size Schemes for Stochastic Nash
Games: Best-Response Schemes and Distributed Gradient-Response Schemes
Jinlong Lei and Uday V. Shanbhag
Abstract—This paper considers an N -player stochastic Nash
game in which the ith player minimizes a composite objective
fi(x) + ri(xi), where fi is expectation-valued and ri has an
efficient prox-evaluation. In this context, we make the following
contributions. (i) Under a strong monotonicity assumption
on the concatenated gradient map, we derive (optimal) rate
statements and oracle complexity bounds for the proposed
variable sample-size proximal stochastic gradient-response (VS-
PGR) scheme; (ii) We overlay (VS-PGR) with a consensus
phase with a view towards developing distributed protocols for
aggregative stochastic Nash games. Notably, when the sample-
size and the number of consensus steps at each iteration grow
at a suitable rate, a linear rate of convergence can be achieved;
(iii) Finally, under a suitable contractive property associated
with the proximal best-response (BR) map, we design a variable
sample-size proximal BR (VS-PBR) scheme, where the proximal
BR is computed by solving a sample-average problem. If the
batch-size for computing the sample-average is raised at a
suitable rate, we show that the resulting iterates converge at a
linear rate and derive the oracle complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Noncooperative game theory [1], [2] is a branch of game
theory that considers the resolution of conflicts among
selfish players, each of which tries to optimize its payoff
function, given the rivals’ strategies. Nash games represent
an important subclass of noncooperative games, originating
from the seminal work by [3]. Such models have seen wide
applicability in a breadth of engineered systems, such as
power grids, communication networks, and sensor networks.
In this paper, we consider the Nash equilibrium problem
(NEP) with a finite set of N players indexed by i where
i ∈ N , {1, · · · , N}. For any i ∈ N , the ith player is
characterized by a strategy xi ∈ Rni and a payoff function
Fi(xi, x−i) dependent on its strategy xi and parametrized
by rivals’ strategies x−i , {xj}j 6=i. If n ,
∑N
i=1 ni and x
denotes the strategy profile, defined as x , (x1, · · · , xN ) ∈
R
n. We consider a stochastic Nash game P where the
objective of player i, given rivals’ strategies x−i, is to solve
the following stochastic composite optimization problem:
min
xi∈Rni
Fi(xi, x−i) , fi(xi, x−i) + ri(xi) (Pi(x−i))
where fi(x) , E [ψi(x; ξ(ω))] , the random variable ξ :
Ω → Rd is defined on the probability space (Ω,F ,P),
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ψi : R
n × Rd → R is a scalar-valued function, and
E[·] denotes the expectation with respect to the probability
measure P. We restrict our attention to nonsmooth convex
Nash games where fi(xi, x−i) is assumed to be smooth and
convex in xi for any x−i while ri(xi) is assumed to be
convex but a possibly nonsmooth function with an efficient
prox-evaluation. A Nash equilibrium (NE) of the stochastic
Nash game in which the ith player solves the parametrized
problem (Pi(x−i)) is a tuple x∗ = {x∗i }Ni=1 ∈ Rn such that
the following holds for each player i ∈ N :
Fi(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≤ Fi(xi, x∗−i) ∀xi ∈ Rni .
In other words, x∗ is an NE if no player can improve the
payoff by unilaterally deviating from the strategy x∗i .
Our focus is two-fold: (i) Development of variable sample-
size stochastic proximal gradient-response (PGR) and prox-
imal best-response (PBR) schemes with optimal (determin-
istic) rates of convergence; (ii) Extension of PGR schemes to
distributed (consensus-based) regimes, allowing for resolving
aggregative games with a prescribed communication graph,
where linear rates of convergence are achieved by combin-
ing increasing number of consensus steps with a growing
sample-sizes of sampled gradients.
Prior research. We discuss some relevant research on
continuous-strategy Nash games and variance reduction
schemes for stochastic optimization.
(i) Deterministic Nash games. Early work considered
convex Nash games (where players solve convex programs)
where the concatenated gradient map is either strongly mono-
tone [4] or merely monotone maps [5], [6]. While the afore-
mentioned schemes utilized gradient-response techniques,
best-response schemes reliant on the contractive nature of
the best-response map were examined in [7].
(ii) Stochastic Nash games. Regularized stochastic ap-
proximation schemes were presented for monotone stochas-
tic Nash games [8] while extensions have been devel-
oped to contend with misspecification [9] and the lack of
Lipschitzian properties [10]. More recently, sampled best-
response schemes have been developed in [11] while rate
statements and iteration complexity bounds have been pro-
vided for a class of inexact stochastic best-response schemes
in [12]–[14]. In fact, we draw inspiration from our work
in [14] to develop superior rate statements and extensions
to distributed regimes. Finally, a.s. and mean convergence of
sequences produced by BR schemes was proven in [13], [15]
for stochastic and misspecified potential games.
(iii) Consensus-based distributed schemes for Nash games.
Inspired by the advances in consensus-based protocols for re-
solving distributed optimization problems, Koshal et al. [16]
developed two sets of distributed algorithms for monotone
aggregative Nash games on graphs. More recently, in [17],
[18], the authors combine gradient-based schemes with con-
sensus protocols to address generalized Nash games.
(iv) Variance reduction schemes for stochastic optimiza-
tion. There has been an effort to utilize increasing batch-
sizes of sampled gradients in stochastic gradient schemes,
leading to improved rates of convergence, as seen in strongly
convex [19]–[21] and convex regimes [20]–[23].
Novelty and Contributions.
(i). VS-PGR. In Section II, under a strong monotonicity
assumption, we prove that a variable sample-size proximal
gradient response (VS-PGR) scheme is characterized by a
linear rate of convergence in mean-suqared error (Th. 1)
while in Th. 2, we establish that the iteration complexity
(in terms of proximal evaluations) and oracle complexity to
achieve an ǫ−NE denoted by x where x satisfies E[‖x −
x∗‖2] ≤ ǫ are O(ln(1/ǫ)) and O ((1/ǫ)1+δ), respectively,
where δ ≥ 0 and δ = 0 under a suitable selection of
parameters. Furthermore, it is shown in Corollary 1 that with
some specific algorithmic parameters, the iteration and oracle
complexity to obtain an ǫ−NE are bounded byO(κ2 ln(1/ǫ))
and by O (κ2/ǫ), where κ denotes the condition number.
(ii). Distributed VS-PGR. In Section III, addressing an
open question in stochastic Nash game, we design a dis-
tributed VS-PGR scheme to compute an equilibrium of an
aggregative stochastic Nash game over a communication
graph. By increasing the number of consensus steps and
sample-size at each iteration, this scheme is characterized by
a linear rate of convergence (Th. 3). In Th. 4, we show that
the iteration, oracle, and communication complexity to com-
pute an ǫ-Nash equilibrium are O(ln(1/ǫ)), O ((1/ǫ)1+δ),
and O (ln2(1/ǫ)) respectively, where δ ≥ 0 and ǫ−NE2
denotes an x satisfying E[‖x− x∗‖] ≤ ǫ.
(iii). VS-PBR. In Section IV, we develop a variable
sample-size proximal BR (VS-PBR) scheme (see Alg. 2)
to solve a class of stochastic Nash games with contractive
proximal BR maps, where each player solves a sample-
average best-response problem per step. We show in Th. 5
that the generated iterates converge to the NE in mean at
a linear rate under suitable number of scenarios, and also
establish that the iteration and oracle complexity to achieve
an ǫ−NE2 are O((ln(1/ǫ)) and O((1/ǫ)2(1+δ)) with δ ≥ 0.
Notation:When referring to a vector x, it is assumed to be
a column vector while xT denotes its transpose. Generally,
‖x‖ denotes the Euclidean vector norm, i.e., ‖x‖ =
√
xTx.
We write a.s. as the abbreviation for “almost surely”. For a
real number x, we define by ⌈x⌉ the smallest integer greater
than x. For a closed convex function r(·), the proximal
operator is defined in the following for any α > 0:
proxαr(x) , argmin
y
(
r(y) +
1
2α
‖y − x‖2
)
. (1)
For simplicity, ξ denotes ξ(ω) and in a slight abuse of
notation, N denotes the number of players while Nk denotes
the batch-size of sampled gradients at iteration k.
II. VARIABLE SAMPLE-SIZE GRADIENT RESPONSE
This section considers the development of a variable
sample-size stochastic gradient response scheme for a class
of strongly monotone Nash games associated with a strongly
monotone concatenated gradient map. We proceed to show
that this scheme produces a sequence of iterates that con-
verges to the Nash equilibrium at a linear rate and establish
the oracle complexity to achieve an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
A. Variable sample-size proximal GR (VS-PGR)
We impose the following assumptions on P .
Assumption 1: Let the following hold.
(a) The function ri is lower semicontinuous and convex with
effective domain denoted by Ri , dom(ri). Suppose R ,∏N
j=1Ri and R−i =
∏
j 6=iRj .
(b) fi(xi, x−i) is C1 and convex in xi over on an open set
containing Ri for every fixed x−i ∈ R−i;
(c) For all x−i ∈ R−i and any ξ ∈ Rd, ψi(xi, x−i; ξ) is
differentiable in xi over an open set containing Ri such that
∇xifi(xi, x−i) = E[∇xiψi(xi, x−i; ξ)].
If G(x; ξ) ,
(∇xiψi(x; ξ))Ni=1 and G(x) , E[G(x; ξ)],
then G(x) = (∇xifi(x))Ni=1 by Assumption 1(iii). The
following lemma establishes a tuple x∗ is an NE of P if
and only if it is a fixed point of a suitable map.
Lemma 1 (Equivalence between NE and fixed point):
Given the stochastic Nash game P , suppose Assumption 1
holds for each player i ∈ N . Define r(x) , (ri(xi))Ni=1.
Then x∗ ∈ X is an NE if and only if x∗ is a fixed point of
proxαr(x− αG(x)), i.e.,
x∗ = proxαr(x
∗ − αG(x∗)), ∀α > 0. (2)
Suppose the iteration index is denoted by k and player
i’s strategy at time k is denoted by xi,k ∈ Rni , which is
an estimate of its equilibrium strategy x∗i . We consider a
variable sample-size generalization of the standard proximal
stochastic gradient method, in which Nk sampled gradients
are utilized at iteration k. Given a sample ξ1k, · · · , ξNkk of Nk
realizations of the random vector ξ, for any i ∈ N , given
xi,0 ∈ Ri, player i updates xi,k+1 as follows:
xi,k+1 = proxαri
[
xi,k − α
∑Nk
p=1∇xiψi(xk; ξpk)
Nk
]
,
where α > 0 is the constant step size, ∇xiψi(xk; ξpk), p =
1, · · · , Nk denote the sampled gradients. Define wpk ,
G(xk; ξ
p
k) − G(xk), and w¯k,Nk , 1Nk
∑Nk
p=1 w
p
k. Then the
aforementioned scheme can be expressed as
xk+1 = proxαr [xk − α (G(xk) + w¯k,Nk)] . (VS-PGR)
We make the following assumptions on the gradient map and
the noise.
Assumption 2: (i) The mapping G(x) is Lipschitz con-
tinuous over the set R with a constant L, namely,
‖G(x)−G(y)‖ ≤ L‖x− y‖ ∀x, y ∈ R.
(ii) G(x) is strongly monotone with parameter η, i.e.,
(G(x) −G(y))T (x− y) ≥ η‖x− y‖2 ∀x, y ∈ R.
(iii) There exists a constant ν such that the following holds
for any k ≥ 0: E[w¯k,Nk | Fk] = 0, E[‖w¯k,Nk‖2 | Fk] ≤
ν2/Nk a.s., where Fk , σ{x0, x1, · · · , xk}.
B. Rate analysis
We begin with a simple recursion for the conditional mean
squared error in terms of sample size Nk, step size α, and
the problem parameters.
Lemma 2: Consider (VS-PGR) and let Assumptions 1 and
2 hold. Define q , 1− 2αη + α2L2. Then for all k ≥ 0,
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2|Fk] ≤ q‖xk − x∗‖2 + α2ν2/Nk, a.s.
Using Lemma 2, we are able to show the linear conver-
gence rate of algorithm (VS-PGR).
Theorem 1 (Linear convergence rate of VS-PGR): Let
(VS-PGR) be applied to P , where Nk =
⌈
ρ−(k+1)
⌉
for
some ρ ∈ (0, 1), and E[‖x0 − x∗‖2] ≤ C for some constant
C > 0. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and α < 2η/L2.
Define q , 1 − 2αη + α2L2. Then the following holds for
any k ≥ 0.
(i) If ρ 6= q, then E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ C(ρ, q)max{ρ, q}k,
where C(ρ, q) , C + α
2ν2
1−min{ρ/q,q/ρ} .
(ii) If ρ = q, then for any ρ˜ ∈ (ρ, 1), E[‖xk−x∗‖2] ≤ D˜ρ˜k,
where D˜ ,
(
C + α
2ν2
ln((ρ˜/ρ)e)
)
.
C. Iteration and Oracle Complexity
Next, we examine the iteration (in terms of proximal
evaluations) and oracle complexity of this scheme to compute
an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, defined next. Recall that a random
strategy profile x : Ω→ Rn is an ǫ−NE if E[‖x−x∗‖2] ≤ ǫ.
Theorem 2 (Iteration and Oracle Complexity): Let
(VS-PGR) be applied to P , where Nk =
⌈
ρ−(k+1)
⌉
for some ρ ∈ (0, 1), and E[‖x0 − x∗‖2] ≤ C. Suppose
Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Define q , 1 − 2αη + α2L2.
Let α < 2η/L2, ρ˜ ∈ (ρ, 1), C(ρ, q) and D˜ be defined
in Theorem 1. Then the number of proximal evaluations
needed to obtain an ǫ−NE is bounded by K(ǫ), defined as
K(ǫ) ,


1
ln(1/q) ln
(
C(ρ,q)
ǫ
)
if ρ < q < 1,
1
ln(1/ρ˜) ln
(
D˜
ǫ
)
if q = ρ,
1
ln(1/ρ) ln
(
C(ρ,q)
ǫ
)
if q < ρ < 1,
(3)
and the number of sampled gradients required is bounded by
M(ǫ), defined as
M(ǫ) ,


1
ρ ln(1/ρ)
(
C(ρ,q)
ǫ
) ln(1/ρ)
ln(1/q)
+K(ǫ) if ρ < q < 1,
1
ρ ln(1/ρ)
(
D˜
ǫ
) ln(1/ρ)
ln(1/ρ˜)
+K(ǫ) if q = ρ
1
ρ ln(1/ρ)
(
C(ρ,q)
ǫ
)
+K(ǫ) if q < ρ < 1.
(4)
Proof. We first consider the case ρ 6= q. By Theorem 1(i),
the following holds:
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ ǫ ⇒ k ≥ K1(ǫ) , ln (C(ρ, q)/ǫ)
ln (1/max{ρ, q}) .
Then we achieve the bound given in equation (3) for cases
ρ < q < 1 and q < ρ < 1. Note that for λ > 1 and any
positive integer K , the following holds:
K∑
k=0
λk ≤
∫ K+1
0
λxdx ≤ λ
K+1
ln(λ)
. (5)
Then we may obtain the following bound:
K1(ǫ)−1∑
k=0
Nk ≤
K1(ǫ)−1∑
k=0
ρ−(k+1) +K1(ǫ) ≤ ρ
−K1(ǫ)
ρ ln(1/ρ)
+K1(ǫ).
Note that for any 0 < ǫ, p < 1, c1 > 0, the following holds:
ρ−
ln(c1/ǫ)
ln(1/p) =
(
eln(ρ
−1)
) ln(c1/ǫ)
ln(1/p)
= eln(c1/ǫ))
ln(1/ρ)
ln(1/p)
= (c1/ǫ)
ln(1/ρ)
ln(1/p) .
(6)
Thus, the number of sampled gradients required to obtain an
ǫ−NE is bounded by
1
ρ ln(1/ρ)
(
C(ρ, q)
ǫ
) ln(1/ρ)
ln(1/max{ρ,q})
+K1(ǫ).
Thus, we achieve the bound given in equation (4) for cases
ρ < q < 1 and q < ρ < 1. The resultd for the case ρ = q
can be similarly proved. ✷
Remark 1: (i) The above theorem establishes that the
iteration and oracle complexity to achieve an ǫ−NE are
O(ln(1/ǫ)) and O((1/ǫ)1+δ), where δ = 0 when ρ ∈ (p, 1),
δ = ln(q/ρ)ln(1/q) when ρ < q < 1, and δ =
ln(ρ˜/ρ)
ln(1/ρ˜) when
q = ρ. (ii) Suppose we use an alternative metric to describe
the ǫ-Nash equilibrium: x : Ω → Rn is an ǫ−NE2 if
E[‖x − x∗‖] ≤ ǫ. Then by Jensen’s inequality if follows
that an ǫ2-NE is also an ǫ-NE2, and hence by Theorem 2 we
obtain that the iteration and oracle complexity to achieve an
ǫ−NE2 are O(ln(1/ǫ)) and O
(
(1/ǫ)2(1+δ)
)
, respectively.
Corollary 1: Let (VS-PGR) be applied to P , where
E[‖x0 − x∗‖2] ≤ C for some constant C > 0. Suppose
Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Define the condition number κ ,
L
η . Set α =
η
L2 and Nk =
⌈
ρ−(k+1)
⌉
with ρ = 1− 12κ2 . Then
the number of proximal evaluations and samples required
to obtain an ǫ−NE are bounded by O(κ2 ln(1/ǫ)) and by
O (κ2/ǫ), respectively.
III. DISTRIBUTED VS-PGR FOR AGGREGATIVE GAMES
Next, we consider an aggregative game Pagg, where the
ith player solves the following parametrized problem:
min
xi∈Rni
F aggi (xi, x−i), (Paggi (x−i))
where F aggi (xi, x−i) , fi(xi, xi + x¯−i) + ri(xi), x¯ ,∑N
i=1 xi denotes the aggregate of all players’ decisions,
x¯−i =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i xj denotes the aggregate of all play-
ers’ decisions except player i, and fi(xi, xi + x¯−i) ,
E [ψi(xi, xi + x¯−i; ξ)] is expectation valued. We impose the
following assumptions on the stochastic aggregative game.
Assumption 3: Let the following hold.
(a) The function ri is lower semicontinuous and convex with
effective domain denoted by Ri required to be compact.
(b) For any y ∈ R¯ , ∑Ni=1Ri, fi(xi, y) is C1 and convex
in xi over an open set containing Ri.
(c) For all y ∈ R¯ and any ξ ∈ Rd, ψi(xi, y; ξ) is
differentiable in xi over an open set containing Ri s.t.
∇xifi(xi, y) = E[∇xiψi(xi, y; ξ)].
A. Algorithm Design
We aim to design a distributed algorithm to compute an
NE of Pagg, where each player may exchange information
with its local neighbors, and subsequently update its es-
timate of the equilibrium strategy and the aggregate. The
communication among players is defined by an undirected
graph G = (N , E), where N , {1, . . . , N} is the set of
players and E is the set of undirected edges between players.
The set of neighbors of player i, denoted Ni, is defined
as Ni , {j ∈ N : (i, j) ∈ E}. Define the adjacency
matrix A = [aij ]
N
i,j=1, where aij > 0 if j ∈ Ni and
aij = 0, otherwise. A path in G with length p from v1 to
vp+1 is a sequence of distinct nodes, v1v2 . . . vp+1, such that
(vm, vm+1) ∈ E , for allm = 1, . . . , p. The graph G is termed
connected if there is a path between any two distinct players.
Though each player does not have access to all players’
decisions, it may estimate the aggregate x¯ by communicating
with its neighbors. Player i at time k holds an estimate
xi,k for its equilibrium strategy and an estimate vi,k for the
average of the aggregate. To overcome the fact that the com-
munication network is sparse, we assume that to compute
vi,k+1, players communicate not once but τk rounds at major
iteration k + 1. The strategy of each player is updated by
a variable sample-size proximal stochastic gradient scheme
that depends on parameters α and Nk, similar to (VS-PGR)
developed in Section II. We now specify the scheme in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Distrib. VS-PGR for Agg. Stoch. Nash Games
Initialize: Set k = 0, and vi,0 = xi,0 ∈ Ri for any i ∈ N . Let
α > 0 and {τk, Nk} be deterministic sequences.
Iterate until convergence
Consensus. vˆi,k := vi,k ∀i ∈ N and repeat τk times
vˆi,k :=
∑
j∈Ni
aij vˆj,k ∀i ∈ N .
Strategy Update. for any i ∈ N
xi,k+1 := proxαri [xi,k − α (∇xifi(xi,k, Nvˆi,k) + ei,k)] , (7)
vi,k+1 := vi,k + xi,k+1 − xi,k, (8)
where ei,k ,
∑Nk
p=1∇xiψi(xi,k,Nvˆi,k ;ξ
p
k
)
Nk
−∇xifi(xi,k, Nvˆi,k).
We impose the following conditions on the communication
graph, gradient mapping, and observation noise.
Assumption 4: (i) The undirected graph G is connected
and the associated adjacency matrix A is symmetric with
row sums equal to one.
(ii) φ(x) , (∇xifi(xi, x¯))Ni=1 is strongly monotone over R
with parameter η, i.e., (φ(x) − φ(y))T (x − y) ≥ η‖x −
y‖2 ∀x, y ∈ R.
(iii) The mapping φ(x) is Lipschitz continuous over R with
a constant L, i.e., ‖φ(x) − φ(y)‖ ≤ L‖x− y‖ ∀x, y ∈ R.
(iv) For any i ∈ N , ∇xifi(xi, y) is Lipschitz continuous in
y over the set R¯ for every fixed xi ∈ Ri, i.e., there exists
some constant Li such that for any xi ∈ Ri,
‖∇xifi(xi, y1)−∇xifi(xi, y2)‖ ≤ Li‖y1−y2‖ ∀y1, y2 ∈ R¯.
(v) If Fk , σ{x0, x1, · · · , xk}, for any i ∈ N , there exists
a constant νi such that the following holds for any k ≥ 0:
E[ei,k|Fk] = 0 and E[‖ei,k‖2|Fk] ≤ ν2i /Nk a.s.
B. Convergence Analysis
Define A(k) , Aτk . Then by Assumption 4(a), A(k) is
also symmetric with the sum of each row equaling one.
Note from the consensus step in Algorithm 1 that vˆi,k =∑N
j=1[A(k)]ijvj,k. We now recall a prior result.
Lemma 3: By Assumption 4 and [24, Proposition 1], there
exists a constant θ > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1) such that∣∣∣∣[Ak]ij − 1N
∣∣∣∣ ≤ θβk ∀i, j ∈ N . (9)
We introduce the transition matrices Φ(k, s) from time s
to time k ≥ s as follows:
Φ(k, s) = A(k)A(k − 1) · · ·A(s), ∀ 0 ≤ s < k,
where Φ(k, k) = A(k). We then obtain the following
recursion on the mean-squared error.
Proposition 1: Consider Algorithm 1, where τk = k + 1
and Nk =
⌈
β−(k+1)/2
⌉
. Define M ,
∑N
j=1 maxxj∈Rj
‖xj‖,
C1 , Mθ
(
1 + 2e
√
1/ ln(β−1/2)
)
, C2 ,
4Mθ
ln(1/β) , and ̺ ,(
1− 2αη + 2α2L2) , where θ and β are defined in Lemma
3. Let Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Then for any k ≥ 0,
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ ̺E[‖xk − x∗‖2] + C3β(k+1)/2, (10)
where C3 is defined as
C3 , α
2
N∑
i=1
ν2i + 4αMN
(
C1β
1/2 + C2
) N∑
i=1
Li
+ 4α2N2
(
C21β
3/2 + C22β
1/2
) N∑
i=1
L2i . (11)
Proof. For purposes of brevity, we merely outline the proof.
Firstly, we give a recursion on the conditional mean-squared
error as follows:
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2|Fk] ≤ ̺‖xk − x∗‖2 + α2
N∑
i=1
ν2i /Nk
+ 4αMN
N∑
i=1
Li‖vˆi,k − yk‖+ 2α2N2
N∑
i=1
L2i ‖vˆi,k − yk‖2.
We then establish an upper bound on the consensus error:
‖yk − vˆi,k‖ ≤Mθβ
∑k
p=0 τp + 2Mθ
k∑
s=1
β
∑k
p=s τp .
Finally, by getting an upper bound on
∑k
s=1 β
∑k
p=s τp ≤
e
√
1/ ln(β−1/2)β(k+1)(k+2)/2 + 2β
(k+1)/2
(k+1) ln(1/β) and taking the
unconditional expectation, we prove the result. ✷
Based on Prop. 1, we can show the linear rate of conver-
gence of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3 (Linear convergence rate of Algorithm 1):
Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Consider Algorithm 1,
where τk = k+1,Nk =
⌈
β−(k+1)/2
⌉
and E[‖x0−x∗‖2] ≤ C
for some C > 0. Let α ∈ (0, η/L2) and define
̺ ,
(
1− 2αη + 2α2L2) . Then we have the following
assertions for any k ≥ 0.
(i) If β 6= ̺2, then E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ C˜(̺, β)max{̺,
√
β}k,
where C˜(̺, β) , C+ C3
1−min{̺/√β,√β/̺} with C3 defined in
Proposition 1.
(ii) If β = ̺2, then for any ˜̺ ∈ (̺, 1), E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤
D˜(̺)˜̺k, where D˜(̺) ,
(
C + C3ln((˜̺/̺)e)
)
.
Similar to Theorem 2, we may derive bounds on the
iteration and oracle complexity as well as the communication
complexity to compute an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4: Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Consider
Algorithm 1, where τk = k + 1, Nk =
⌈
β−(k+1)/2
⌉
and E[‖x0 − x∗‖2] ≤ C for some constant C > 0. Let
α ∈ (0, η/L2) and define ̺ , (1− 2αη + 2α2L2) . Let
˜̺ ∈ (̺, 1), C˜(̺, β) and D˜(̺) be defined in Theorem 3.
Then the number of proximal evaluations needed to obtain
an ǫ−NE is bounded as follows:
K(ǫ) ,


1
ln(1/̺) ln
(
C˜(̺,β)
ǫ
)
if β < ̺2 < 1,
1
ln(1/ ˜̺) ln
(
D˜(̺)
ǫ
)
if β = ̺2,
1
ln(1/β1/2)
ln
(
C˜(̺,β)
ǫ
)
if ̺ < β1/2 < 1,
and the round of communications is
(K(ǫ)+1)(K(ǫ)+2)
2 , and
the number of sampled gradients required is bounded by
M(ǫ) ,


(
C˜(̺,β)
ǫ
) ln(1/β1/2)
ln(1/̺)
β1/2 ln((1/β1/2)
+K(ǫ) if β < ̺2 < 1,
(
D˜(̺)
ǫ
) ln(1/̺)
ln(1/ ˜̺)
β1/2 ln((1/β1/2)
+K(ǫ) if β = ̺2,(
C˜(̺,β)
ǫ
)
β1/2 ln((1/β1/2)
+K(ǫ) if ̺ < β1/2 < 1.
Remark 2: Recall that in [25], a fast distributed gradient
algorithm based on Nesterov’s accelerated gradient algorithm
is employed to solve a distributed convex optimization prob-
lem, where at each step, O(ln(k)) consensus steps are taken.
In [25], the authors show that in merely convex settings,
the rate is O(1/k2) (optimal) and total number of commu-
nications rounds is O(k ln(k)) up to time k. Our scheme
(Algorithm 1) requires O(k2) rounds of communications to
recover the optimal linear rate of convergence but does so in a
stochastic game-theoretic regime. In future work, we intend
to investigate how the number of consensus steps may be
chosen to maintain geometric convergence while reducing
communication overhead.
IV. VARIABLE SAMPLE-SIZE PROX. BEST RESPONSE
In this section, we consider the class of stochastic Nash
games in which the proximal BR map is contractive [26].
We propose a variable sample size proximal BR scheme for
computing an equilibrium, and derive rate statements and
establish iteration and oracle complexity bounds.
A. Background on proximal best-reponse maps
For any i ∈ N and any tuple y ∈ Rn,
define the proximal BR map x̂i(y) as x̂i(y) ,
argminxi∈Rni
[
E [ψi(xi, y−i; ξ)] + ri(xi) + µ2 ‖xi − yi‖2
]
.
We impose the following assumption on problem (Pi(x−i)).
Assumption 5: (i) Assumption 3(i).
(ii) For every fixed x−i ∈ R−i, fi(xi, x−i) is C2 and
convex in xi over on an open set containing Ri. Moreover,
∇xifi(xi, x−i) is assumed to be Lipschitz continuous in xi
uniformly in x−i with constant Li, i.e., for any xi, x′i ∈ Ri,
‖∇xifi(xi, x−i)−∇xifi(x′i, x−i)‖ ≤ Li‖xi − x′i‖.
(iii) For all x−i ∈ R−i and any ξ ∈ Rd, ψi(xi, x−i; ξ)
is differentiable in xi over an open set containing Ri.
Moreover, for any i ∈ N and all x ∈ R, there exists Mi > 0
such that E[‖∇xifi(x) −∇xiψi(xi, x−i; ξ)‖2] ≤M2i .
By Assumption 5, the second derivatives of the functions
fi, ∀i ∈ N on R are bounded. Analogous to the avenue
adopted in [26], we may define
Γ ,


µ
µ+ζ1,min
ζ12,max
µ+ζ1,min
. . .
ζ1N,max
µ+ζ1,min
ζ21,max
µ+ζ2,min
µ
µ+ζ2,min
. . .
ζ2N,max
µ+ζ2,min
...
. . .
ζN1,max
µ+ζN,min
ζN2,max
µ+ζN,min
. . . µµ+ζN,min

 (12)
where ζi,min , infx∈X λmin
(∇2xifi(x)) and ζij,max ,
supx∈X ‖∇2xixjfi(x)‖ ∀j 6= i. Then by [11, Theorem 4]
we obtain that

‖x̂1(y′)− x̂1(y)‖
...
‖x̂N (y′)− x̂N (y)‖

 ≤ Γ


‖y′1 − y1‖
...
‖y′N − yN‖

 . (13)
If the spectral radius ρ(Γ) < 1, then the proximal best-
response map is contractive w.r.t. some monotonic norm.
These sufficient conditions for the contractive property of
the BR map x̂(•) can be found in [11], [26].
B. Variable sample-size proximal BR scheme
Suppose at iteration k, we have Nk samples ξ
1
k, · · · , ξNkk
of the random vector ξ. For any xi ∈ Xi, we approximate
fi(xi, y−i,k) by 1Nk
∑Nk
p=1 ψi(xi, y−i,k; ξ
p
k) and solve the
sample-average best-response problem (14). We then get the
variable-size proximal BR scheme (Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 2 Variable-size proximal BR scheme
Set k := 0. Let yi,0 = xi,0 ∈ Xi, and {γi,k}k≥0 be a given
deterministic sequence for i = 1, . . . , N .
(1) For i = 1, . . . , N , player i updates estimate xi,k+1 as
xi,k+1 = argmin
xi∈R
ni
[ 1
Nk
Nk∑
p=1
ψi(xi, y−i,k; ξ
p
k)
+ ri(xi) +
µ
2
‖xi − yi,k‖
2
]
.
(14)
(2) For i = 1, . . . , N , yi,k+1 := xi,k+1;
(3) Set k := k + 1 and return to (1).
C. Oracle and iteration complexity
Define εi,k+1 , xi,k+1− x̂i(yk). We may obtain an bound
on E[‖εi,k+1‖2] in the following lemma.
Lemma 4: Suppose Assumption 5 holds. Consider Al-
gorithm 2. Then E[‖εi,k+1‖2] ≤ M
2
i C
2
r
Nk
, where Cr ,
µ
µ2+L2 (1− L/
√
µ2 + L2)−1 with L , maxi Li.
Proof. Define w¯i,k(xi) ,
1
Nk
∑Nk
p=1∇xiψi(xi, y−i,k; ξpk) −
∇xifi(xi, y−i,k). By the optimality condition, xi,k+1 and
x̂i(yk) are respectively a fixed point of the map proxαri
[
xi−
α
(∇xi f˜i(xi, yk)+ w¯i,k(xi))] and proxαri[xi−αf˜i(xi, yk)]
for any α > 0. Then by the nonexpansive property of the
proximal operator, the following holds for any α > 0 :
‖εi,k+1‖ ≤ α‖w¯i,k(xi,k+1)‖
+
∥∥∥xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk)− α (f˜i(xi,k+1, yk)− f˜i(x̂i(yk), yk))∥∥∥
≤
√
(1− αµ)2 + α2L2‖εi,k+1‖+ α‖w¯i,k(xi,k+1)‖.
In the above inequality, by setting α = µµ2+L2 , we obtain that
‖εi,k+1‖ ≤ Cr‖w¯i,k(xi,k+1)‖. Then by using Assumption
5(iii), the lemma is proved. ✷
Similar to [14, Prp. 4], we can prove the linear rate
of convergence. We then establish the iteration and oracle
complexity to obtain an ǫ−NE2, which is random strategy
profile x : Ω→ Rn satisfies E[‖x− x∗‖] ≤ ǫ.
Theorem 5: Suppose Ass. 5 holds and a , ‖Γ‖ <
1. Let Algorithm 2 be applied to the stochastic Nash
game (Pi(x−i)), where E[‖xi,0 − x∗i ‖] ≤ C and Nk =⌈
maxiM
2
i C
2
r
η2k
⌉
for some η ∈ (0, 1). Define c , max{a, η},
let η˜ ∈ (c, 1), and D = 1/ ln((η˜/c)e). Then the number of
the deterministic optimization problems solved and samples
required by player i to obtain an ǫ−NE2 are O(ln(
√
N/ǫ))
and O
((√
N/ǫ
) 2 ln(1/η)
ln(1/η˜)
)
, respectively.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We consider a class of stochastic Nash games where each
player-specific objective is a sum of an expectation-valued
smooth function and a convex nonsmooth function. We con-
sider three schemes: (i) Variable sample-size proximal gra-
dient response (VS-PGR) for strongly monotone stochastic
Nash games; (ii) Distributed VS-PGR for strongly monotone
aggregative Nash games; and (iii) VS proximal best-response
(VS-PBR) for stochastic Nash games with contractive best
response maps. Under suitable assumptions, we show that all
schemes generate sequences that converge at the (optimal)
linear rate and derive bounds on the computational, oracle,
and communication complexity.
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